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Abstract 
This study contains an overview of the energy sectors of the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) and an analysis of current and potential energy cooperation with the 
EU and within the region. 
In order to strengthen security of supply and foster competition, the infrastructure 
priorities should be the completion of a network of gas and electricity interconnectors 
with and within the EaP region, and the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline. In 
parallel, one should revive the goal of achieving a binding legal framework for the secure 
transit of energy in the region involving all relevant parties, including Russia. 
Existing horizontal areas of cooperation, in particular energy efficiency, lowering import 
dependence, and renewable energy, are clearly justified. Two new areas should be 
added, namely the production of unconventional fossil fuels, and the adoption of 
alternative fuels in transport.  
In terms of framework conditions, convergence towards the EU Acquis faces strong 
challenges from both domestic and foreign interest groups in several EaP countries. The 
main focus should be on those measures most likely to enhance security of supply in 
each country.  Also, the coherence between the various existing EU instruments for 
regional cooperation should be strengthened. 
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Executive summary 
It is sometimes assumed that, when it comes to energy, the EU-27 and the six Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – share little in common. 
Energy cooperation is still underdeveloped; competition between these states, external pressures and 
limited investments in energy transportation infrastructures contribute to explaining and perpetuating 
this relative lack of cooperation. At the same time, the EU-27 and its Eastern Partners share some 
common energy trends. Electricity and natural gas will play an important role in future energy mixes 
while coal will stay attractive only for countries that heavily rely on imports. Oil demand should remain 
flat despite EU calls for cleaner energy sources. These common trends should pave the way for further 
cooperation between Eastern partners and the EU. 
The Eastern Partnership offers a variety of options for cooperation ranging from deep integration into 
the single European energy market to bilateral cooperation under separate contracts. However, without 
being prescriptive, the EU is keen that all partner countries enshrine the implementation of legal 
obligations related to the EU energy market in their national legislation. Currently only Moldova and 
Ukraine have committed themselves to implementing the relevant directives, owing to them being 
signatories to the Energy Community. Armenia and Georgia, as potential members of the Energy 
Community, are likely to eventually do so, as is Azerbaijan, which is a special case owing to its 
importance as an alternative to Russia as a supplier of hydrocarbons. Energy relations between the EU 
and partner countries are regulated under Platform 3 of the Eastern Partnership. In November 2009, the 
first meeting of the group working on the Platform, which was dedicated to energy security, approved a 
plan for implementation by the end of 2011, with four key objectives: Enhancing framework conditions 
and solidarity; Support for infrastructure development, interconnection and diversification of supply; 
Promotion of increased energy efficiency and use of renewable resources; Regulatory framework and 
approximation of energy policies.  
Even though all of the partner countries declare a readiness to adapt their regulatory frameworks to EU 
standards, their progress vary considerably. Undoubtedly, geography and geopolitics impose strong 
limits on the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and the multilateral track with regard to energy. 
Moreover, in the post-Soviet area political systems are intertwined with the control of the energy sector. 
At present the formal, government-led cooperation with the EU conceals a variety of vested interests 
and stakes in blocking reforms by governmental and business actors. In view of the elusive interest in 
reforming the energy sector from the governmental level, wide-ranging, strategic and sustained EU 
engagement with the EaP countries to promote energy security is required. It is clear that for the 
‘frontrunners’, such as Moldova and Ukraine, the participation of EaP partner countries in the Energy 
Community and other EU energy-related initiatives has not yet fulfilled the expectations. While 
cooperation has been intensive and wide-ranging, the actual effectiveness has been relatively low 
within the EaP. 
In spite of the difficulties highlighted, several examples of successful commercial and inter-
governmental cooperation can be observed in the EaP region and between the region and EU Member 
States. This is most visible in terms of the actual and potential shipments of both oil and gas from 
Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Ukraine. Ukraine can then serve as a platform for further deliveries to 
Central Europe as well as to Belarus and Moldova.  
What may finally be emerging, if very haltingly, is a loose region straddling Central and Eastern Europe 
and the South Caucasus, including both EU and non-EU countries, which are gradually developing new 
sources and new routes for energy supplies in a manner which does not objectively contradict the 
established bilateral relationships between larger Member States and the Russian Federation. While the 
latter continues to rely on the “Russian model” of long-term bilateral integration based on bespoke 
pipelines and long-term contracts, the former may flourish based on interconnection and sea-based 
transportation of fossil fuels (both LNG and crude oil). These are potentially very positive developments, 
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and analyses suggest that, ultimately, the EaP countries have far more to learn and far more to share 
with the New Member States than with countries further West, at least in terms of security of supply. 
Recommendations: 
 Support the completion of a network of gas and electricity interconnectors with and within the 
EaP region. 
 Support the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to Poland’s Baltic Sea coast. 
 Refocus support for the adoption of the Acquis in the EaP region on those elements most likely to 
enhance energy security in the region, in particular the unbundling of gas transmission systems 
and the implementation of the principle of Third Party Access. 
 Pursue the existing policy areas that have been identified for multilateral cooperation with the 
EaP countries and that are considered well justified, i.e. greater energy efficiency, lower import 
dependence, the adoption of renewable energy. 
 Introduce two additional areas of cooperation between the EU and its Eastern partners 
o The production of unconventional fossil fuels (in particular shale gas);  
o Transport system transformation in order to achieve lower oil dependence, i.e. support 
for the adoption of alternative transport fuels, in particular electric cars. 
 For the energy efficiency and transport system goals, focus action on bottom-up approaches at 
the municipal and regional levels. 
 Strengthen the coherence between existing instruments in relation to energy security in the East 
(EaP, BSS, ECT, INOGATE, the Baku Initiative/Process). 
 Revive the long-term goal of achieving a binding legal framework for the secure transit of energy 
between all relevant parties in the EU and in the EaP region, and including Russia. 
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ENERGY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK 
ON FUTURE DEMANDS IN THE EU AND ITS EASTERN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD 
1.1 Overview of the current energy situation 
It is sometimes assumed that, when it comes to energy, the EU-27 and the six Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – share little in common. The 
six Eastern neighbours have followed different paths since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Despite various initiatives – INOGATE, the Energy Charter Treaty, the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
the Black Sea Synergy, and the Energy Community – they hardly cooperate with each other and with 
the EU. This is a direct legacy from the fall of the USSR. 
Despite relatively well developed energy interconnections among the former Soviet Republics, they all 
turned to Russia once the former empire collapsed. For instance, the United Power System of 
Transcaucasia did not live through the early 1990s. While Armenia used to provide between 3 and 3.5 
GWh to Azerbaijan and Georgia in the 1980s, it stopped right after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. In 
Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus, all countries rather chose to develop their ties with Russia. To a 
large extent this is still true today. Various initiatives from external political actors such as the EU or the 
United States have tried to foster energy cooperation among the former Soviet Republics. Except 
between Azerbaijan and Georgia, they have failed most of the time for several reasons. The two most 
salient ones are probably competition and rivalry between these states as well as external pressure 
undermining such cooperation prospects. 
Limited investments in energy transportation infrastructures also contribute to explaining and 
perpetuating this relative lack of cooperation. The EU-27 and its Eastern partners’ degree of interest in 
specific commodities may also differ, which makes cooperation more difficult to develop. For instance, 
from 2001 to 2004, the newly built Odessa-Brody pipeline, which was supposed to ship Caspian oil to 
Poland and Ukraine, remained empty. While it was promoted by the European Commission, Caspian 
producers as well as Eastern European consumers showed little interest for this pipeline. Only the 
disruption of hydrocarbons supply from Russia made this energy infrastructure attractive in the late 
2000s. 
As shown in graph 3, the size of markets varies tremendously among the six EaP states. The Ukrainian 
energy market is by far larger than the other ones even if the Azerbaijani and Belarusian markets are 
increasingly important. Because of such discrepancies, energy cooperation may prove difficult to 
develop between these countries. Consequently, in some parts of the EU-27 as well as in the six EaP 
states, transmission service operators suffer from a lack of funding and a poor access to technology. As a 
corollary, the lack of reliable energy transportation infrastructures makes cooperation harder. 
Nonetheless, these states and the EU-27 share some common trends, which may pave the way for 
further cooperation.  
First, natural gas is the preferential source of energy. For EaP countries, this is a direct legacy from Soviet 
times, when industrial and residential consumers heavily relied on gas. This commodity was - and still is 
to some extent - the favoured energy source for heat and power generation. In 2009, except in the EU-
271 and in Ukraine (its share is 26% and 44% respectively), it represented more than 50% of the total 
consumption of energy (see annex 2.1). In Armenia and Moldova, natural gas accounted for 78% and 
85% of the total energy consumption. 
                                                               
1 In the EU-27, natural gas also represented only 26% of the energy mix. However, it is assumed that this share will 
increase rapidly. It will be 33% in 2015 and 38% in 2035. Natural gas will be the major source of energy by then. 
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Second, except in the EU-27, the energy markets of the Eastern European countries remain largely 
monopolistic. State-owned companies in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
are in charge of the state energy policy. Despite regular calls for privatisation, the state is still reluctant 
to liberalise a strategic economic sector. Such a tight state control over the energy sector makes foreign 
investments less easy. It also leads to a poor allocation of financial resources. In Azerbaijan, Belarus and 
Ukraine, state energy companies perform social duties usually devoted to the state social agencies. As a 
consequence, less money is available to improve the energy infrastructures or to promote energy 
efficiency. 
Third, except in Azerbaijan, Georgia and the EU-27, Russia is the largest supplier of gas. In 2010, Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine gas imports entirely came from Russia. Moscow also supplied 76% of gas 
imported by Armenia. In the meantime, Russian pipelined gas represented around 28% of the EU-27 gas 
imports in 2010. The share of Russian gas is likely to increase, providing new fields come on stream in 
Russia and new export routes to Europe (such as Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines) are 
implemented. Moscow remains largely influential in this part of the world despite political competition 
from the EU or the United States. The on-going gas price negotiations between Russia and EaP 
countries underlines the leverage the former still enjoys over its neighbours. 
Fourth, in all six EaP countries and in some EU countries energy efficiency remains low. Industry still 
relies heavily on hydrocarbons and has not proven energy-efficient yet. As a Soviet legacy - when 
energy was very cheap - residential consumption remains high as well. Whereas gas tariffs increased 
and awareness-raising campaigns on energy efficiency were carried out in EaP countries, most of the 
individual consumers still pay little attention to energy savings. Finally, transportation infrastructures 
are out-dated, which causes a lot of waste. While energy efficiency appears as a major objective to 
decrease energy dependency, it is striking to notice how little interest is given to this issue. Lack of 
funding, poor access to technology (for smart grids for instance) and opposite political interests may 
explain this situation. Energy intensity remains high (Ukraine has the largest energy intensity among the 
EU-27 and the other EaP countries) and undermines any energy policy initiatives. 
All the countries considered here are energy producers. But, except in Azerbaijan since 2006, domestic 
production is not sufficient to cover their energy needs. Thus, all the other partners have to import 
energy resources - mostly hydrocarbons - to sustain their economic growth. 
1.2 Future Energy Demand 
To understand the evolution of energy demand in the EU-27 and in the six Eastern Partnership 
countries, we have used a methodology based on three different timeframes: 2009, 2015 and 2035. It 
refers to the present energy situation and outlooks in the medium term and in the long term. The year 
2009 is chosen for two reasons. First, it is the latest year with the most reliable data for all the markets 
considered. Second, it helps to analyse how these markets react in time of economic crisis, which is 
important given the global economic context. The year 2015 then provides a mid-term view, 
considering the economy would slightly recover from the on-going crisis. Finally, the long-term analysis 
is based on the year 2035 in order to shed light on the evolution of the considered markets over a 20-
year period. If special attention is given to hydrocarbons, the aim is still at covering the main energy 
commodities, i.e. oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables. The latter – nuclear energy and 
renewables – are encompassed under a single label: electricity. Finally, in the annexes a figure per capita 
view was added in order to facilitate cross-country comparisons. It may also help to underline in which 
country energy efficiency should be promoted. While scarcity of energy resources is likely to increase, 
the latter is critical from a public policy perspective. 
With the exception of Azerbaijan, the EU-27 and the other five Eastern partners will rely more and more 
on foreign energy resources. From 2015 onwards, most of the energy demand will be covered by 
imports. 
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Between 2009 and 2035, coal and oil demand should decline sharply in the EU-27 (-86% and -65% 
respectively, see annex 3). This should be the result of ambitious policies aiming at decreasing CO2 
emissions. As a consequence, electricity and gas demand is expected to increase (+23% and +25% 
respectively). Large parts of electricity consumption should come from renewable energy. Since the 
Fukushima accident in Japan in 2011, nuclear power has become less attractive. It is not expected that 
the EU-27 will promote this source of energy in the coming decade. The need for new energy supplies 
may result in further investments in renewable energy and increased gas imports. For modelling 
purposes, the EU-27 energy demand is expressed in a single graph (annexes 4 and 5). 
Between 2009 and 2035, oil demand is expected to increase in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, by 50%, 
78% and 51% respectively. Various reasons are behind this trend. In Azerbaijan and Ukraine, the 
economy has a large industrial base, which relies heavily on hydrocarbons. This trend is not expected to 
change in the long term and more oil and gas will be needed to support the growth of the economy. In 
Azerbaijan, increasing commercial demand for oil products will drive oil demand. Baku is promoting 
these products in order to limit the financial outputs of the incoming oil peak, expected in 2013-2015. 
However, we assume that oil production should still be able to deal with this increasing demand. In 
Georgia, such a sharp increase reflects Azerbaijan’s role as a transit country. Every day, Azerbaijani, 
Kazakhstani and Turkmen oil volumes are shipped through the country. Some of these volumes are 
expected to stay in Georgia to satisfy oil demand there (up to 1.8 million tons in 2035). In addition, 
domestic oil production should go over 5,000 barrels per day by 2020 onwards. In Ukraine, the decline 
of gas imports will drive a rising oil demand. Lastly, in Belarus, demand should stay flat (-3%).  
Between 2009 and 2035, gas demand will increase everywhere, expect in Belarus and Ukraine. Due to 
regular disputes over Russian gas purchase prices, Minsk and Kiev expressed their willingness to 
decrease gas imports. Such a policy should lead to 5% and 16% decline of gas demand - respectively - 
by 2035. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, gas demand will increase significantly (+55%, 
+57%, +41% and +26% respectively). In the two South Caucasian states, this will result in the rise of 
Azerbaijani gas production. The Azerbaijani industry still relies heavily on gas for power generation 
while some Azerbaijani gas exports are expected to stay in Georgia. In Armenia and Moldova, such an 
increase is aimed at supporting the development of the economy and high residential consumption. 
But it would also increase energy dependency over external suppliers, i.e. Iran and Russia. Despite 
strong expectations of successful shale oil and gas exploration in most of the EaP countries, no 
significant change in these forecasts is expected. Except in Azerbaijan, gas demand is very likely to be 
covered by imports from large producers such as Iran, Russia and perhaps Iraq. 
Between 2009 and 2035, electricity demand should steadily rise by 20-30% in EaP countries. In Armenia, 
this increase should reach 51%. Large parts of this rise should come from renewable energy. EaP 
countries are expected to invest in this source of energy in order to decrease the role of natural gas in 
power generation. Some states, such as Belarus, have shown some interest for nuclear power but the 
feasibility of projects seems less likely since the Fukushima accident. Lack of investment capacity may 
also undermine this kind of projects. In addition, increase of domestic electricity production seems to be 
the most effective way to decrease dependency over hydrocarbons imports.  
Coal demand is almost non-existent in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia. In these two countries, 
mining is likely to come to an end, which will lead to strong decrease of coal demand. In Moldova and 
Ukraine, it should increase by 25% and 33% respectively. In both cases, such a rise reflects energy 
diversification policies. Ukraine should rely on coal to face its gas imports decrease. In Moldova, coal 
imports from Ukraine are considered to be an effective way to decrease energy dependence on Russia. 
Therefore, the EU-27 and its Eastern partners share some common energy trends. Electricity and natural 
gas will play an important role in future energy mixes while coal will stay attractive only for countries 
that heavily rely on imports. Oil demand should remain flat despite EU calls for cleaner energy sources. 
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1.3 Country Analysis 
1.3.1 The EU-27 
The Fukushima accident has put a hold to the nuclear renaissance in Europe. This energy source was 
somehow promoted as the miracle energy solution to sustain economic growth and reduce CO2 
emissions. However, as Germany is about to close all its nuclear plants, the EU-27 will have to look for 
alternative energy sources. The EU has to deal with three challenges: reducing its carbon footprint, 
facing depletion of indigenous hydrocarbon resources and diversifying energy imports. 
Unless shale oil and gas exploration is successful, the EU will have to improve its access to energy and 
find clean sources of energy. In this perspective, significant investments in renewable energy are 
expected, especially in solar and wind energy. Important energy savings are also expected to reduce 
carbon footprints. In addition, energy imports should be diversified. The so-called shale gas revolution 
in North America has made available new LNG volumes, which should be re-routed to Europe. 
Nonetheless the EU still needs to look at new gas producers such as Azerbaijan, Iraq and Turkmenistan. 
However, while gas demand may increase slower than previously expected, the EU will have to make its 
energy market attractive for producers. Indeed, these are concerned with the current state of the 
European gas markets.  
First, according to the International Energy Agency, Asian gas demand may increase by 4.9% per 
annum, against 0.6% per annum for the EU. While gas markets still remain mostly regional, any drop in 
demand may have huge consequences for producers, especially the LNG ones.   
 Second, some producers, such as Russia, are concerned about EU gas markets becoming more and 
more difficult to access in the future. Indeed, the Third Energy Package will constrain producers to 
separate upstream and midstream activities, which is not in the interest of companies like Gazprom.  
Third, natural gas is a difficult commodity to ship in. Be it LNG or piped gas, expensive infrastructures are 
needed and usually take time to implement. For producers that find it difficult to attract investments 
such as Turkmenistan, markets closer than the EU ones may be more attractive. 
Finally, the EU needs to improve its energy transportation networks to finalise the implementation of a 
common energy market. New routes need to be built and existing networks should be upgraded. The 
European Commission considers that around 210 billion Euros will be needed to upgrade or build gas 
pipelines and power grids by 2020. Half should be delivered by the market unaided and up to 140 
billion Euros will require public sector’s help to source and leverage the necessary private capital. 
Despite the current economic slowdown, we expect these investments to become reality. Indeed, the 
oil and gas industry is strongly recovering from the economic crisis and should be able to finance such 
investments. The development of energy routes would foster further integration of energy markets and 
make available new energy sources from the Caspian, the Middle East and North Africa.  
1.3.2 Armenia 
Armenia faces a difficult situation. Due to the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, it relies on 
Georgia and Iran for energy imports. However, while Azerbaijan is investing more and more in Georgia, 
the latter seems to become a less and less reliable partner for Armenia. For instance, the Armenian 
authorities are concerned about Georgia’s intention to privatise the Georgian part of the North-South 
Pipeline, which supplies Russian gas to Armenia. The Azerbaijani state-owned oil company SOCAR is 
believed to bid for this pipeline. 
In addition, Armenia suffers from the increase in Russian gas prices. In 2012, gas price might reach 
US$210/mcm (against US$180/mcm in 2011). In order to decrease its dependency on Russia, Armenia is 
looking at Iran to diversify its gas imports. In 2010, 23% (0.4 bcm) of Armenian gas imports came from 
Iran, through the Tabriz-Sardarian gas pipeline. However, due to the international blockade on Iran, the 
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Iranian energy sector seriously lacks investment. Consequently, gas production is lower and the export 
potential is decreasing. Iran consumes a large part of its total gas production. In addition, high 
transportation costs make gas supplies to Iranian Northern neighbours less commercially viable. Most of 
the gas volumes delivered by Iran to Armenia and Turkey actually come from Turkmenistan to decrease 
transportation costs. Therefore, the growth potential for Armenian gas imports from Iran seems to be 
rather limited. 
Armenia mostly relies on electricity production from the Metsamor nuclear plant to decrease its energy 
dependency. This facility was closed in 1988, following an earthquake. It was reopened in 1995 to soften 
the effects of the Azerbaijani-Turkish blockade. However, this nuclear plant is situated on a seismic fault 
and is considered as ageing and dangerous in various EU-funded and US-funded reports. The main 
concern is that this plant has no containment structure. Thus, the EU and the United States have called 
for the implementation of at least mitigation measures. After the Fukushima accident, such a facility is a 
threat for the whole region. Nonetheless, due to the economic blockade and increasing gas prices, 
Armenia has no choice but to rely on this plant to meet its energy needs. Yerevan had to delay the 
decommissioning of the plant further while the latter was supposed to start by 2017. To increase its 
energy independence, Armenia has no other choice than to build a new nuclear plant. However, the 
government has found it difficult to attract some $5 billion that are needed to build such an 
infrastructure. Unless shale oil exploration is successful – the authorities estimated in 2005 the possible 
reserves to be between 17 and 18 million tons – Armenia will stay an energy-dependent country whose 
energy security lies on an out-dated nuclear plant. 
1.3.3 Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is in a much more comfortable situation. Despite peak oil production expected for 2013-
2015, gas production should reach 54 bcm per annum by 2025. Even if local gas demand increases, 
most of this production will be exported to Europe. Baku can rely on safe export routes for its 
hydrocarbons, mostly built in the late 1990s and 2000s: the Baku-Batumi railroad, the Baku-
Novorossiysk oil pipeline, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, and the 
South Caucasus gas Pipeline (SCP). Existing gas volumes from the giant Shah Deniz gas field are 
supplied to Turkey through the latter. By 2017, up to 16 bcm per annum will come on stream. In the 
medium term, Azerbaijan will rely on the SCP pipeline and on the Turkish network to ship these new gas 
volumes to new pipelines in Europe. A decision - on the chosen route - is supposed to be taken by 
March 2012. Four projects are now being considered: the Interconnection Turkey-Greece-Italy, the 
Nabucco pipeline, the South East European Pipeline and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline. In the long term, all 
these projects are likely to be connected to a dedicated gas pipeline through Turkey operated by 
Azerbaijani and Turkish state-owned companies and called Trans-Anatolian Pipeline. 
In the meantime, Baku intends to diversify its gas exports. So far, it has been selling gas to Georgia, Iran 
(as part of a swap deal aimed at supplying the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan), to Russia and to 
Turkey. It now hopes to ship gas to Eastern Europe (Bulgaria and Romania) and to the Middle East 
(Syria). Azerbaijan is also expected to increase its role as a transit country. For the time being, it ships oil 
volumes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the Black and Mediterranean Seas. In the long term, 
Caspian gas volumes should add up to these oil exports. 
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Graph 1 – Azerbaijani gas exports in 2010 
 
 
Despite its huge reliance on its hydrocarbon bonanza, Azerbaijan also invests in renewable energy. In 
spring 2011, the State Agency on Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources signed a partnership with 
the United Nations Development Programme to promote the development of sustainable energy. 
Important investments are now expected in wind energy (which has huge potential in Azerbaijan), solar 
energy, biomass and geothermal power. 
Table 1 – Azerbaijani oil and gas exports in 2010 
 Georgia Iran Russia Turkey World markets2 
Gas exports (in bcm) 1.03 0.35 0.72 4.35  
Oil exports (in million barrels per day)     0.99 
 
1.3.4 Belarus 
Like Armenia, Belarus is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon imports, mostly from Russia. This 
dependency is two-fold. On the one hand, Russian gas is needed as a feedstock for industry and as heat 
for residential consumers. On the other hand, oil products are the major export goods for Belarus. 
Thanks to an effective refining sector, Minsk transforms oil imports into oil products, such as gasoline for 
oil exports. Any disruption in its hydrocarbon imports thus has major consequences for the whole 
Belarusian economy. 
Due to its geographic location, Belarus plays a strategic role in Russian oil and gas exports to Europe. 
Approximately 20% of gas sales and 30% of oil sales to European markets go through Belarus. Thanks to 
this strategic location, Belarus has enjoyed a relatively stable energy supply. But, like Ukraine, Minsk had 
to deal with continuous gas price negotiations with Russia. To solve this issue, Minsk agreed in 
November 2011 to transfer 100% ownership of the Belarusian gas transmission operator – Beltransgaz – 
to Gazprom for $5 billion. In exchange, the Russian company reduced gas prices for Belarus from $280 
per mcm to $165 per mcm. This deal is likely to help Minsk guarantee its gas supply from Russia. 
However, it also increases its dependency towards its big neighbour. In this perspective, the latter now 
aims at diversifying both its energy imports and sources. 
The share of natural gas in the Belarusian energy mix is expected to stay flat and then to decrease 
slightly over the next twenty years. Upgrades of gas-fired power generations should help supporting 
                                                               
2  The main export markets for Azerbaijani oil are Italy, Russia and Turkey. 
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this political ambition.  Power capacity which will be built within the next five years is expected to rely 
on coal and hydro. Belarus also intends to import up to 1 million ton of Azerbaijani oil in 2012 through 
the Odessa-Brody pipeline. Even if Russian oil supplies seem to be more stable than in previous years, 
this should provide more predictability to the Belarusian refining sector. As part of the Beltransgaz deal, 
the Belarusian authorities also expect Russia to allocate a $10 billion credit line to the future Belarusian 
nuclear plant. The latter should have two reactors of about 2,300 MW and could be built by the Russian 
company, Rosatom. Lastly, Minsk is expected to continue investing in renewable energy, mostly 
biomass. In 2007, 20 million KWh was produced from biomass and waste. 
1.3.5 Georgia 
Georgia has very well recovered from the winter of 2006. Then, Gazprom cut gas exports to West 
Georgia, including Tbilisi. In order to decrease energy dependency over Russia, the Georgian authorities 
decided to diversify the energy mix. It heavily invested in renewable energy, mostly hydropower. 
Indeed, Georgia has the second largest hydroelectric resources in the world. This helped Georgia to 
decrease its energy dependency while exporting electricity to Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Serbia. Tbilisi 
plans to build three hydropower plants from 2012 onwards. These plants are expected to produce 1.5 
TWh. The Georgian authorities also intend to develop wind power and are assessing the country’s 
capacity at 2,000 MW. 
In addition, Georgia plays a key role in Caspian oil and gas exports to Europe and the Mediterranean. All 
the major oil and gas transportation infrastructures in the South Caucasus, such as the BTC and SCP 
pipelines, are crossing Georgia. As part of the intergovernmental agreement on the SCP, Georgia is 
entitled to 5% on gas volumes being shipped through the SCP plus another 5% at a discount price. It 
enjoys a similar transit fee in nature for the North-South gas Pipeline, receiving 10% of the shipped gas 
volumes. Both transit fees cover most of Georgian gas needs.  
Finally, in recent years, the Georgian authorities have subsequently liberalised the gas sector. The 
Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR has bought most of the assets and is now the largest player on the 
Georgian gas sector. It controls most of the distribution companies and has started a gasification 
programme of Georgian provinces. This should develop access to energy in Georgia’s remote regions. 
One might be concerned that Georgia has shifted from energy dependency on Russia to energy 
dependency on Azerbaijan. However, huge investments in hydropower and energy savings campaigns 
make Georgia an energy model for the other EU Eastern partners. 
1.3.6 Moldova 
Moldova probably faces the toughest energy situation among the EU Eastern Partnership countries. 
Without indigenous resources and as a landlocked country, it suffers from difficult access to energy. It 
heavily relies on imports from Belarus, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, the most important 
power plant is located in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Finally, the economic crisis has 
prevented the Moldovan authorities from making much needed investments in the energy sector. 
However, there is potential for improvement. First, in 2010, the local electricity corporation 
MoldIteraElectric has expressed its willingness to build a 450-megawatt gas-fired power plant in 
Southern Moldova. It should give independent access to power generation. Second, Moldova may 
benefit from its role as transit country. Indeed, the Western gas Pipeline, which supplies Russian gas to 
Turkey crosses its territory. Third, Moldova has been able to increase its coal imports from Ukraine. 
Fourth, it plans to develop in cooperation with Ukraine shale gas prospects. In statements that sound 
quite optimistic, the Moldovan authorities expect that this gas will come on stream by 2017. 
Besides, the country may benefit from its integration into regional energy organisations. In 2009, 
Moldova joined the Energy Community and signed in 2011 a Plan for implementation of the acquis in 
the field of renewable energy. There is a potential in biomass, solar and energy. Being part of the Energy 
Community should give Chisinau access to technology and funding. In the 2020 Energy Strategy, 
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approved in 2007, the Moldovan authorities have put emphasis on renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. If Moldova is expected to continue relying on imports, this should decrease pressure on a 
tight energy sector. 
1.3.7 Ukraine 
In recent years, Ukraine has suffered from continuous gas disputes over gas prices with Russia. Despite 
local gas production of around 20 bcm per annum, high energy inefficiency makes gas imports critical 
for the industrial sector. While the latter accounts for a large base of the economy, these regular 
disputes have put the country’s economy at risk. This systemic energy inefficiency constrains Kiev to 
import large volumes of energy resources, mostly coal and hydrocarbons. In addition, Ukraine suffers 
from an out-dated energy transportation network, which is at the detriment of both its transit role and 
its industrial energy supplies. 
While Russia seems to be more and more likely to implement the South Stream gas pipeline, which 
would bypass Ukraine, Kiev may fall short of Russian gas. To face this situation, the Ukrainian authorities 
have passed a law aimed at decreasing the role of natural gas in the economy. As a consequence, it is 
assumed that gas demand will decrease over the coming decades. Ukraine may also look for alternative 
gas supplies. In this perspective, it expresses more and more interest to build a LNG plant on the shore 
of the Black Sea aimed at receiving liquefied gas volumes from Azerbaijan. Gas would be transported by 
pipeline to the Georgian coast on the Black Sea, then liquefied and shipped by tankers to Ukraine and 
Romania. While the expected start-up date – 2015 – seems to be unrealistic, the feasibility of this project 
has increased over the last few months. Both Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated a strong political 
willingness to implement it. The difficult gas price negotiations between Kiev and Gazprom also make 
this project more attractive to Ukraine. Consequently, although the commercial rationale of this project 
is not obvious, it is more and more likely to turn into reality, given the on-going political context. 
Coal and nuclear power are likely to become the main alternatives to natural gas. Nuclear- and coal-
fired generation may account for more than three-quarters of energy generation over the next 20 years. 
Despite huge potential in renewable energy, especially, in geothermal and wind energy, this sector 
received less interest than fossil fuels from the Ukrainian authorities. Though, the combined installed 
capacity of both wind and solar power plants is rapidly increasing. Kiev hopes that, thanks to new 
facilities, this capacity could reach 600 MW by the end of 2012. For instance, in 2011, Ukraine initiated in 
the Donetsk region a wind farm pilot project with an expected capacity of 107.5 MW by late 2012. 
Unless shale gas exploration, likely to start in late 2012, is proven successful, increased investments in 
renewables seem to be critical to sustain increasing Russian gas prices. 
2. OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR BETWEEN 
THE EU AND THE PARTNER COUNTRIES WITHIN THE EAP 
Energy security is one of the areas of cooperation within the framework of the Eastern Partnership 
falling under Platform 3 Environment, Climate change, Energy security). This section of the study starts 
by exploring the financial support provided by the EU in the sphere of energy. This will be followed by 
an analysis of progress made towards each of the four core objectives outlined under Platform 3, 
including bilateral and multilateral tracks of relations as well as domestic and geopolitical factors which 
have impinged on EU’s cooperation with the partner countries. This analysis will incorporate the legal 
and regulatory approximation which has been achieved (using mainly Ukraine as a case study).  
2.1 Financial support 
The six partner countries of the Eastern Partnership were allocated €600 million for 2010-2013. Out of 
this amount, € 175 million is to be spent on the Comprehensive Institution Building programme, €75 
million for piloting regional development programs with €350 million of funds allocated for the 
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implementation of the EaP according to the four thematic platforms. No detailed, sector-related 
specifications for the financing of cooperation in energy security were provided. According to the guide 
for the funding of the EaP programme, it is anticipated that costs will be targeted at supporting 
institutional capacity building (including twinning and technical support such as TAIEX) and budget 
support.  For example in the case of Ukraine, the National indicative programme for 2011-2013 
envisages a deepening of the sectoral approach with €70 million allocated for promoting energy 
efficiency (divided into €63 million towards budget support and €7 million on twinning and technical 
assistance). 
During the second summit of the EaP in Warsaw in 2011, it was decided that about €1.9 billion would be 
spent in bilateral and regional programmes through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) during 2011-13. More specifically, the EU would continue to develop energy 
cooperation with partner countries through the INOGATE programme3, particularly as ‘energy security 
and diversification of supply cannot be seen in isolation and the INOGATE programme also links the EaP 
region to Central Asia’.4 (However, the linkage with Central Asia dilutes the overall amount of funding 
available to the EaP partners within INOGATE). At present, the EaP does not sufficiently take into 
account broader developments in the region, such as Ukraine’s co-operation with the Visegrad group 
(V4) and work taking place between Moldova and Romania (see below). It was anticipated that for 2010-
2011, €32 million would be available for the Regional Electricity Markets, Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy Sources Flagship Initiative, which, amongst other things, included support for 
energy regulation, harmonisation of standards and legislation, activities in support of renewable 
energy, energy efficiency in the building sector.5 
In 2009 the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund (E5P) was established, 
funded to the tune of €90 million for 2010-2013 to improve energy efficiency and extended use of 
renewable energy, focused on Ukraine but also extending to other partners. In addition, €63 million 
from the EU’s Budget Support on Energy Efficiency was made available to Ukraine, the first tranche of 
which was €7 million for technical assistance to strengthen the institutional capacity of state agencies to 
implement the budget support already provided and used in 2010-2011. 
In sum, it can be seen that multiple sources of financing have been made available for a number (and, in 
some cases overlapping) areas. While the level of funding could be improved, it is important to note 
that other factors equally affect the overall progress and effectiveness of cooperation. 
2.2 Analysis of progress made towards the four core objectives of Platform 
The EaP states are characterised by a high degree of importance for EU’s energy security. For example, 
out of the six partner countries, there are five which are central to energy security: Azerbaijan (as a 
supplier of oil and potentially gas in the future, as well as being on the transit route of hydrocarbons 
from the Eastern Caspian), Georgia (as a transit route for Caspian oil and gas), Belarus (as a transit route 
of Russian oil and gas), Ukraine (as the transit route of gas and oil from Russia, Central Asia and Caspian 
region) and Moldova (as the transit of Russian gas to southern Europe). As Armenia is not a transit or 
supply country it has a minor role when it comes to cooperation with the EU in the energy sector. 
                                                               
3  The INOGATE programme, which includes the EU and 12 post-Soviet states, is regarded as a trailblazer for energy 
co-operation in this region. Launched in the 1990s, it originally aimed to promote the regional integration of pipeline 
systems and to facilitate oil and gas transport within the post-Soviet states and onwards to EU markets. Over the years, 
INOGATE's scope has been extended to cover issues in relation to electricity, renewable energy and energy efficiency. In 
addition, the programme encourages private investment and support from international financial institutions. INOGATE’s 
technical secretariat is based in Kiev. 
4  EuropeAid. Update on Eastern Partnership implementation. EaP Summit 29-30 September 2011, 
Warsaw. http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/2011_eap_implementation_en.pdf 
5  Ibidem. 
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The importance conferred on Ukraine by the sheer volume of gas flowing from Russia to the EU, is 
reflected in the documentation signed between Ukraine and the EU, particularly the Memorandum of 
Understanding on energy cooperation signed in December 2005, the joint Ukraine - EU declaration on 
the modernisation of Ukraine's gas transit system, signed in March 2009 and, particularly, the 
communication from the Commission on security of energy supply and international cooperation 
entitled ‘The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders’ adopted in September 
2011.6  
In the case of Azerbaijan, energy is by far the most important area for cooperation with the EU. 
Azerbaijan is an important oil exporter and its natural gas production has increased as a result of the 
development of the Shah Deniz offshore field. Nevertheless, the cooperation in the energy sector is 
hampered by Azerbaijani elites’ scepticism about EU policy towards the post-Soviet space and 
prospects for economic integration with the EU. Moreover, within Azerbaijan, support for closer 
cooperation with the EU is difficult to secure because of the perceived lack of EU support for the 
country’s territorial integrity. Therefore, the EaP is predominantly seen as a means of asserting the 
country’s role as a major regional and international energy player and obtaining the EU’s support for the 
development of the strategic energy infrastructure. Even though Azerbaijan has declared an interest in 
all objectives of Platform 3, in practice the country is highly strategic. The energy projects that are not 
perceived as having strong political support within the EU do not attract the Azerbaijani government’s 
attention.7 
The EaP offers a variety of options for cooperation ranging from deep integration into the European 
energy market to bilateral cooperation under separate agreements. However, without being 
prescriptive, the EU is keen that all partner countries enshrine the implementation of legal obligations 
related to the EU energy market in their national legislation. Legal approximation is regarded as a 
template for reforms of the energy sector and a precondition for participation in various EU initiatives 
and programmes, such as the Energy Community. This central role of legal approximation makes it a 
difficult proposition for the partner countries. Currently only Moldova and Ukraine have committed 
themselves to implementing the relevant directives, owing to them being signatories to the Energy 
Community. Armenia and Georgia, as potential members of the Energy Community, are likely to 
eventually do so. Azerbaijan, which is a special case owing to its importance as an alternative to Russia 
as a supplier of hydrocarbons, is unlikely to do so.  
Energy relations between the EU and EaP states are regulated under Platform 3. The first meeting of the 
group working on the Platform in November 2009, approved a plan for implementation by the end of 
2011, with four key objectives: 
 Core objective 1: Enhancing framework conditions and solidarity. 
 Core objective 2: Support for infrastructure development, interconnection and diversification of 
supply. 
 Core objective 3: Promotion of increased energy efficiency and use of renewable resources. 
 Core objective 4: Regulatory framework and approximation of energy policies.8 
The remaining part of this section will explore the progress which has been made towards the 
achievement of these four objectives in the bilateral and multilateral contexts, including an analysis of 
the legal and regulatory approximation. However, overall the multilateral track plays a relatively minor 
role. Between 2009 and 2011 there were five platform meetings in the format EU27+6, in which energy 
relations between partner countries and the EU were discussed. However, little was achieved other than 
noting progress towards the achievement of key objectives. 
 
                                                               
6  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0539:FIN:EN:PDF 
7  R. Shirinov (2011) ‘A Pragmatic Area for Cooperation: Azerbaijan and the EU’, IPG 3/2011. 
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2.2.1 The first objective: Enhancing framework conditions and solidarity 
As regards the first key objective, representatives of all participating countries generally perceive energy 
security in terms of the security of supply to their respective countries. At the same time, there has also 
been some willingness to discuss specific projects to integrate the work of partner countries. This, 
however, has failed to gain traction as there was no mechanism within the EaP which would allow the 
partners to work together in this way without excluding anybody. (For example, consensus was difficult 
to achieve as Armenia and Belarus tended to take opposing positions.)  
As a result, the implementation of the first key objective was postponed indefinitely. This is despite the 
fact that, for example, an agreement on some sort of early warning mechanism triggering a rapid 
response to energy supply crises was deemed critical (see below).  
2.2.2 The  second  objective:  Infrastructure  development,  interconnection  and  diversification  of 
supply  
Under the second objective are issues related to the integration of Gas Transportation Systems (GTS) of 
partner countries into the planned EU integrated gas supply system, which will come into existence in 
2015. However, the EU makes discussion of such proposals with the partner countries conditional upon 
harmonisation of their energy legislation with the relevant EU regulations. Yet, both Ukraine and 
Moldova have failed to implement the second energy package, not to mention the third, which is of 
vital importance to the EU.  
In the context of the implementation of the second energy package an important task of the Moldovan 
government is the physical interconnection of the national gas pipeline system to the Romanian 
system, the interconnection Ungheni-Iasi, with the possibility of pumping natural gas in both directions. 
The importance of this interconnection has been discussed for over a decade. The energy crises in 
January 2006 and 2009 have shown the consequences of an energy shortage and reinvigorated the 
need to strengthen energy security of Moldova. Although the government promised at the end of 2010 
that construction works would start in 2011, so far only feasibility studies have been prepared, the 
proper work being planned for 2012. The slow pace of construction work on the Ungheni-Iasi gas 
pipeline seems again to be conditioned by the fear of Gazprom losing its monopoly position on the 
Moldovan market. The EU allocated €7 million (€3 million to Moldova, and €4 million to Romania) out of 
the necessary of €20 million through the Joint Operational Programme Romania – Ukraine – Republic of 
Moldova.9 
Some discussions have taken place between the EU and the Eastern partner states (Ukraine, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia) regarding the diversification of oil supplies to countries to Central and Eastern Europe. A 
basis for this already exists, as enunciated in a Communication from the Commission which stated that 
‘with respect to the oil sector, the implementation of the Euro-Asian Oil Transportation Corridor is of 
high priority and would offer a direct access to Caspian crude oil’.10 
2.2.3 The  third  objective:  Promotion  of  increased  energy  efficiency  and  use  of  renewable 
resources 
The third objective is strongly supported by the EU but it attracts a notably lower level of interest in the 
partner countries, despite their overall inefficiency in use of energy and/or an interest in decreasing 
their energy dependency on Russia. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
8  Core objectives and Work Programme 2009-2011, as adopted on 5 November 2009 
9 I. Muntean, ‘The first consequences of the third energy package for the Republic of Moldova’, the Eastern 
Partnership Community (Dec 2011), 
10 Communication from the Commission ‘The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders’, 
COM/2011/0539 July 2011, p.6. 
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In Ukraine, for example, the EU is prepared to continue financing the development and implementation 
of the ‘Law On Energy Efficiency’ along with reform and improvement in the operational effectiveness 
of the State Agency for Energy Efficiency, regulators and other regional development initiatives related 
to energy efficiency and renewable energy, as outlined in the Covenant of Mayors (see below). Other 
initiatives include that of the Swedish presidency related to energy efficiency programs in Eastern 
Europe with a pilot project in Ukraine, as well as projects funded by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other international financial institutions and donors. 
However, at the municipal level in the partner countries there is a higher level of interest. The Covenant 
of Mayors, a European Commission initiative, is a commitment by signatory towns and cities to go 
beyond the objectives of EU energy policy in terms of reduction in CO2 emissions through enhanced 
energy efficiency and cleaner energy production and use. This has provided a very useful instrument for 
engagement at the sub-national level in the EaP partner countries. For example, despite a lack of 
support from the national government, the city of Tbilisi has been keen to promote energy efficiency 
benefitting from exchanges within and support from the Covenant of Mayors. 
2.2.4 The fourth key objective: Regulatory framework and approximation of energy policies 
The fourth objective is finding its strongest expression in work undertaken as a result of membership of 
the Energy Community. In general, however, progress is turgid. This reflects the high degree of 
politicisation of the energy sector with a number of strong domestic and regional players uninterested 
in changing the status quo. In Ukraine, for example, a new law ‘On fundamentals of the functioning of 
the natural gas market’, developed on the basis of the second EU Gas Directive was adopted on July 8, 
2010 only under pressure from the EU, as a prerequisite for Ukraine's membership in the Energy 
Community. However, its implementation is being blocked by powerful domestic interests. 
Notwithstanding its overall interest in integration, Georgia is also being slow to adapt to European 
energy legislation owing to increased pressure on the government by owners of vertically integrated 
energy companies, who object to the prospect of their businesses being broken up and loss of control 
over the market. Azerbaijani SOCAR, which is a vertically integrated company, may be in a position to 
further delay the ‘Europeanisation’ of Georgia's energy sector if it ends up acquiring the 24% Georgian 
Oil and Gas Corporation, as it is at present aiming to.  
At the same time, there is evidence of Russian efforts to impede (or be able to do so) partner countries 
approximating the legal and regulatory requirements of the EU. For example, 50% of the shares and 
management positions in Moldovagaz, the energy supplier in Moldova, are held by Gazprom 
representatives; furthermore, 4 of the 6 members of the Supervisory Board, and 4 of 9 Board members 
are from the Russian company, (whereas according to the Statute, there should be no more than 3 
Gazprom representatives on the Supervisory Board and the Board respectively).11 Further evidence of 
Russian influence is reflected in the signing of the so-called Kharkiv agreements between Ukraine and 
Russia and continued negotiations with Gazprom, in which discussions related to concessions in the 
price of gas requirements are explicitly related to demands that Ukraine renounce its membership of 
the Energy Community. In the case of Moldova, Russia halted the new gas contract negotiation in 
December 2011. As one of the conditions, the Russian government demanded that Moldova gives up 
its intention to implement the European Union’s third energy package, 12 as it would directly impinge on 
Russia’s interest in the energy sector in Moldova. 
As has already been noted, during 2009-11 Moldova and Ukraine joined the Energy Community having 
satisfied the initial requirements to align national legislation with European energy legislation. 
                                                               
11 http://www.moldovagaz.md/menu/ru/about-company/structure 
12 I. Muntean I., The first consequences of the third energy package for the Republic of Moldova, the Eastern 
Partnership Community (Dec 2011), http://www.easternpartnership.org/ 
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According to the procedural rules laid down in the Treaty establishing the Energy Community in 2005, 
Ukraine and Moldova have twelve months to adhere to the basic principles on the internal electricity 
market and provide conditions for access to cross-border transmission of electricity. European 
legislation also requires Ukraine and Moldova to make changes to its laws, in particular, to create 
conditions for a competitive electricity market, to ensure a uniform approach to pricing for all 
categories of consumers, to ensure the price of electricity allows for necessary investment, and ensure 
the implementation of appropriate environmental standards in the generation of electricity. However, 
Ukraine’s membership in the Energy Community is characterised by slow progress (see box 1). In 
additional to numerous domestic problems with implementation, in both countries Russia currently 
attempts to dissuade them from implementing the third energy package in exchange for lowering the 
gas price, which, as of December 2011, exceeds $400 per 1,000sqm for Moldova and Ukraine. 
Box 1. Ukraine in the Energy Community: Progress in Legal Approximation 
The reforms required as part of membership of the Energy Community are only possible through strict 
policy of alignment of prices for all categories of consumers, the privatisation of state electricity 
generating companies and attracting foreign investors. While some laws have been amended, such as, 
for example, ‘On Production Sharing Agreements, On Electricity, On Principles of Natural Gas Market 
Operation (17 July 2011), insufficient reform has taken place to address the points above. In particular, 
the issue of integrating Ukraine into a single European energy transmission system (ETNSO-E), which 
also requires considerable investment, remains unresolved. Financing through the EaP could support 
the implementation of ambitious plans to expand exports of Ukrainian electricity to the EU. However, 
this is only possible once Ukrainian power supplies have integrated with ENTSO-E, which in turn 
requires compliance with EU legislation and will be capital intensive. Environmental issues, primarily the 
reduction of harmful emissions and CO2, waste recycling thermal power plants, the reduction of 
environmental pollution by service companies remain unaddressed.  
At present, the law ‘On principles of the natural gas market in Ukraine’ inadequately takes into account 
requirements of membership of the Energy Community as regards creating a competitive market.  
Through political lobbying, Ukrainian oil and gas companies block an open market in gas owing to a 
number of factors including: contracts which preclude the re-export of Russian gas origin, regulated 
prices for gas domestic production besides endemic corruption.  
At the same time, access for European companies to the Ukrainian market is also hindered by Gazprom, 
which appears to regard post-Soviet states as ‘its own’ territory, making European companies reluctant 
to enter into competition with Russian companies in the post-Soviet states.  
 
In sum, it can be concluded that despite a promising start, and the availability of considerable EU funds, 
the degree of progress which has been achieved under Platform 3 in terms of energy security has been 
highly circumscribed. This appears to be attributable to three factors: first, the lack of political will in the 
partners countries, in which vested interests often have little incentive to conduct necessary reform in 
pursuit of approximation, as it will in many cases harm their own commercial interest; second, the EU’s 
reluctance to delve into the geopolitics which surrounds the transportation of hydrocarbons and the 
subsequent prioritisation of bilateral with Russia (over the heads of the transit countries) in order to 
ensure those supplies, and, third, Russian commercial and political interests which in the ‘shared 
neighbourhood’ aimed at retaining levers of influence in the post-Soviet space. 
2.2.5 Overview of EU‐EaP cooperation to date 
Even though all of the partner countries need to build their capacities to undertake the necessary 
structural reforms and declare a readiness to adapt their regulatory frameworks to EU standards, their 
readiness, aspirations and progress vary considerably, even with regard to specific aspects of 
cooperation on energy. 
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Undoubtedly, geography and geopolitics impose strong limits on the effectiveness of bilateral 
cooperation and the multilateral track with regard to energy. The six countries do not form a 
contiguous geographical area with three of them being located in Eastern Europe and a further three in 
the south Caucasus. This makes it, for example, difficult to agree and implement the EaP Flagship 
Initiatives (see above) as openly acknowledged in the Warsaw Declaration of September 2011. 
Therefore, even though the EaP encourages regional cooperation on energy issues by various means, 
progress within the multilateral framework has proved particularly arduous to achieve to the extent that 
it may be seen to hamper rather than facilitate progress.13 
All the governments of the EaP countries declare the interest in cooperation with the EU on energy 
issues. However, one should not simply equate these declarations at a political level with a support and 
demand for domestic change as such. One of the features of the post-Soviet regimes is intertwining of 
the political systems with the control of the energy sector. It is worth noting that the ENP and EaP were 
launched at a considerably later stage of the post-communist transformation than in East-Central 
Europe. This allowed time to consolidate a range of vested interest in the status quo in their respective 
energy sectors. Indeed, in many countries, the energy sector has become a beacon for the current 
political regimes. At present the formal, government-led cooperation with the EU conceals a variety of 
vested interests and stakes in blocking reforms by governmental and business actors. In view of the 
elusive interest in systematic reforming the energy sector from the governmental level, wide-ranging, 
strategic and sustained engagement with the EaP countries to promote energy security is required.  
It is clear that for the ‘frontrunners’, such as Moldova and Ukraine, the participation of EaP partner 
countries in the Energy Community and other EU energy-related initiatives has not yet fulfilled the 
expectations. The implementation of reforms in Ukraine and Moldova, required under the Energy 
Community, have undoubtedly been hindered by businesses engaged in non-transparent energy 
management who were wary of losing control and fearful of increased competition from European 
companies and the reaction of monopolistic suppliers (i.e. Russia). Indeed, failure to reform their internal 
energy market in accordance with the legal norms of the EU, in line with their obligations as members 
of the Energy Community threatens to undermine the whole process of energy integration which may 
lead to their exclusion from the Community, which may in turn impact on how energy issues are dealt 
with within the EaP.  
Yet there are also geopolitical factors at play which put further impediments in the way of reform. The 
EU has chosen to largely overlook these factors. In 2007, a Communication from the Commission on 
energy transportation in the Black Sea region stated that ‘the Commission is not intending to offer an 
new Black Sea strategy, since a broad EU policy towards the region has already been formulated in the 
pre- strategy towards Turkey, the ENP and the strategic partnership with Russia’14. This stance is being 
reaffirmed with the EaP: the EU does not seem intent on offering the countries in the EaP a strategy 
customised to their specific needs. A corollary of this is that while cooperation has been intensive and 
wide-ranging, the actual effectiveness has been relatively low within the EaP. 
2.2.6 Progress on an Early Warning Mechanism with Russia 
After the January 2009 gas crisis, the European Commission and Russia intensified their discussions on a 
bilateral early warning mechanism.15 A Memorandum on an Early Warning Mechanism in the Energy 
Sector within the Framework of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was signed in Moscow in November 
                                                               
13 K. Wolczuk (2011) ‘Perceptions of, and Attitudes towards, the Eastern Partnership amongst the Partner 
Countries' Political Elites’, Eastern Partnership Review, No 5, Estonian Centre for Eastern Partnership. 
14 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_160_uk.pdf (page2) 
15 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/security_of_supply/cooperation_en.htm. See also M.Gonchar, 
A.Duleba, O.Malynovsky (2011) Ukraine and Slovakia in a post-crisis architecture of European energy security.  Prospects for 
transport of hydrocarbons and bilateral cooperation, Bratislava, pр. 103-104 . 
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2009. The Memorandum foresees the implementation of joint measures to prevent and respond quickly 
in the event of any likely situations of emergency in the energy sector, including disruptions of gas 
supply. According to the comments of the Minister of Energy of Russia, who signed the Memorandum 
from the Russian side, ‘[Memorandum] establishes a formalised communication technology of the 
Russian Federation and the European Union to notify each other about possible risks, their concerns, 
and launches mechanism for coordinated actions’.16 The creation of a multilateral early warning 
mechanism with the framework of the EaP was discussed in January 2010 by the Foreign Ministers of 
Ukraine and Spain (during the Spanish presidency of the EU), and later that month during the Spanish-
Russian talks in Moscow. In general, Russia was constructive regarding the creation of such a 
mechanism on a trilateral basis (supplier - transit - consumer) as evidenced by the statements of Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: “We are convinced that a solution must be sought, including (…) early 
warning on a tripartite basis with the main producer, transit and (…) main consumers. We are 
convinced that the solution must be sought on the basis of balancing the interests of all sides of this 
triangle17.”  
As of the time of writing, the only proposal is to create an early warning mechanism between the EU 
and the EaP partner countries which would coexist with the bilateral mechanism already established 
between the EU and Russia. However, an early warning system should be built given the potential 
benefits which could accrue to all parties, as outlined in the Core objectives and Work Programme 2009-
2011 (namely: ‘Encourage the development and implementation of mutual energy support and security 
mechanisms, including early warning mechanisms and joint security actions’). 
The energy projects that are not perceived as having strong political support within the EU do not 
attract the Azerbaijani government’s attention.18 
                                                               
16 See "Russia and the EU signed a Memorandum on an Early Warning Mechanism in the Energy Sector", News of 
Ministry of Energy of Russia Federation, 16 Nov2009. 
17 See http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/0A30BED7C473249DC3257655002B6F21 
18  R. Shirinov (2011) ‘A Pragmatic Area for Cooperation: Azerbaijan and the EU’, IPG 3/2011. 
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3. COMMON INTERESTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER 
COOPERATION  
In this final section an overarching analysis is proposed, leading to the identification of objective current 
and potential areas of common interest and to the formulation of policy recommendations for 
cooperation with the EaP countries. The analytical framework that is proposed draws on the concept of 
energy vulnerability as developed in the energy security literature. 
3.1 Understanding energy security 
The concept of energy vulnerability is well-defined and indices have been developed to quantify it in 
peer-reviewed literature. Gupta (2008) and Gnansounou (2008) are notable contributions. A critical 
review of those approaches and a strengthening of definitions and theory are given in Christie (2009) 
where energy vulnerability is defined as: 
“The extent to which adverse exogenous events with respect to a country’s energy supply system may 
detrimentally affect the welfare of the country’s population and/or the integrity of the State, its territory 
or its institutions.” 
It is essential in this context to further distinguish between short-term and long-term challenges to 
energy security, and to also distinguish between risks and threats. Christie (2009) defines risks and 
threats as mutually exclusive categories of potential adverse events, whereby threats arise from hostile 
intent, whereas risks do not. This framework is summarised in Table 3.1 and is especially suited to the 
analysis of the security of supply of fossil fuels from the point of view of a net importer state. 
Table 3.1 – Typology of short- and long-term risks and threats to energy security 
 
  Risks Threats 
Accidents, natural disasters affecting CI Supply cut-off (supplier or transit state) 
Insufficient stockholdings / storage Blockade/interdiction (rival/enemy state) 
Short-
term 
Price spike due to demand-supply gap Sabotage/attack on CI (e.g. non-state actor) 
Insufficient investment production/transport Strategic foreign takeover of energy assets 
Unsustainable demand in importer states Foreign and security policy concessions 
Unsustainable demand in exporter states   
Insufficient reserves in one exporter state   
Long-
Term 
Globally insufficient reserves (e.g. "peak oil")   
Note: CI = critical energy infrastructure  
Both short- and long-term threats are of particular relevance for the EaP countries, as noted in Sections 
1 and 2. Supply cut-offs by the supplier have affected most EaP countries at various times, and both 
takeover attempts and foreign and security policy concessions have been observed, notably but not 
exclusively in the case of Ukraine. Long-term risks are also important. Low energy efficiency is in 
evidence in all EaP countries. It raises their import dependence, thus increasing both risks and threats, 
both short-term and long-term. In the case of Russia, high domestic consumption (roughly two thirds of 
Russia’s gas production is used inside Russia) eats away at the country’s export potential. Insufficient 
investment in infrastructure is also a general risk throughout the region – even leading to serious 
concerns about Russia’s future export potential a few years ago, see e.g. Riley (2006). A more recent 
analysis would show that Gazprom’s enormous revenues of recent years provide it with a considerable 
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margin of manoeuver, thus mitigating that particular risk. On the other hand, the lack of funds for the 
modernisation of Ukraine’s gas transmission system is a well-known and as yet unsolved problem. 
In general, energy vulnerability can be assessed both quantitatively and holistically by focusing notably 
on ten variables that can be grouped as follows: macroscopic (e.g. overall energy intensity of the 
economy), diversification (long-term security), resilience (short-term security), and foreign and security 
policy aspects (relations with suppliers, with third parties). 
1. Macro: Import dependence ratio (% of demand covered by net imports) 
2. Macro: Energy intensity of the economy (per unit of GDP) 
3. Macro: Share of the product (e.g. oil, gas) in the overall energy mix 
4. Diversification: Diversity of import sources 
5. Diversification: Diversity of transit routes 
6. Resilience: Storage capacity & actual stored volume 
7. Resilience: Interconnection of transmission systems 
8. Resilience: Short-term substitutability (e.g. based on dual-fuel facilities)  
9. Foreign and security policy: relations with supplier countries 
10. Foreign and security policy: risks or threats due to third parties 
While some authors attempt to develop a single index that would ‘chain together’ some of these 
variables (and more), a more flexible approach consists in creating ‘score cards’, separately for each 
main energy product (i.e. oil, gas, coal), with brief quantitative and qualitative indicators for each 
variable. Adequate quantitative economic models can also be used to simulate the effects of specific 
scenarios or events, e.g. a supply cut-off or a spike in prices of given magnitudes. (Such assessments 
should of course be classified.) 
The score card approach also enables a bird’s eye view of potential areas for public policy intervention 
as well as for cross-border cooperation. 
3.2 Energy vulnerability assessment: natural gas 
3.2.1 Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
In line with the macroscopic and diversification variables listed in the previous section, the three EaP 
countries should seek to reduce their dependence on Russian supplies by raising energy efficiency, 
raising domestic production where feasible (e.g. shale gas), developing new sources of imports (new 
routes are only useful if it is for a new source), and possibly reconsidering the role that natural gas 
should play in the energy mix. Better interconnection would be a key measure for higher resilience to 
short-term threats, and diversification of import sources would be an important strategic step towards 
greater security. Each of these key policy areas is discussed in this sub-section. 
Energy efficiency 
EaP countries have shown limited interest in energy efficiency policies at the national level. However, as 
noted in Section 2.2.3, cooperation is stronger at the municipal level. This suggests that a shift in focus 
(and resources) towards the sub-national (regional and municipal) levels could perhaps yield better 
results on a bottom-up basis. However high-level political engagement should continue at the national 
level. The key element in that discussion is to look at energy prices and taxation, as clear price signals 
are what is ultimately required for significant shifts in energy demand, and such policies are at the 
national level. The case of Ukraine’s stop-go reform of domestic gas prices has shown that conditionality 
can be useful, i.e. by creating linkages between energy price reforms and other areas of cooperation. 
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Domestic production 
According to EIA (2011), shale gas resources are significant in some regions of Europe. Table 3.2 
presents the estimated technically recoverable shale gas resources for four countries in the region, 
alongside their 2009 levels for production and consumption of conventional natural gas. Poland is 
clearly in the lead in the region, both in terms of absolute volume of shale gas resources and in terms of 
how many years of domestic consumption could be covered with those resources. In the case of 
Ukraine the resources are relatively sizeable, but they only represent around 27 years of consumption 
(at the level of 2009). This strengthens yet again the case for Ukraine to consider more ambitious 
demand-side policies if it wishes to seriously modify its current dependence patterns. These are early 
days though, as the discoveries are recent and production has yet to begin. Challenges remain at the 
administrative level, e.g. licencing rules. On the other hand, geological assessments will continue in the 
region, and resource estimates will be adjusted accordingly. There is still considerable uncertainty about 
the level of possible resources elsewhere in the region, e.g. in Romania and Moldova. Also, as Poland is 
emerging as a front-runner and could have substantial resources also for exports to its neighbours, it 
would seem most attractive to foster regional cooperation in order to share best practice in terms of 
geological assessments and technical know-how, and in order to foster an open and competitive 
business climate and an efficient regulatory framework. In that context one could consider whether a 
Flagship Initiative devoted specifically to unconventional gas should be created in the context of the 
Eastern Partnership, and what funding could be allocated to it. In that context, cooperation with the 
United States – which heralded the shale gas revolution a few years ago – would be essential. Poland 
and (perhaps) Romania should be encouraged to take the lead from the EU side. 
Table 2 – Shale gas resources in selected European countries 
  Production 
(bcm) 
Consumption 
(bcm) 
 Import 
dependence 
Technically 
Recoverable Shale 
Gas 
Resources (bcm) 
Years of consumption
(2009 level) 
Poland 5.9 16.4 64% 5295.1 322.4 
Turkey 0.8 35.1 98% 424.7 12.1 
Ukraine 20.4 44.2 54% 1189.3 26.9 
Lithuania 0.0 2.8 100% 113.3 40.0 
Source: EIA (2011), author calculations 
System resilience 
Concerning resilience (to short-term threat supply cut-offs), the goal should be to raise the resilience of 
each gas transmission system by interconnecting with neighbouring transmission systems – exactly 
what the New Member States in Central and Eastern Europe are in the process of achieving with new 
interconnectors, partly thanks to EU co-financing (notably EEPR and TEN-E funds). This success story 
illustrates how well-chosen levels of co-financing overcome the hurdle of market fragmentation. Similar 
(i.e. relatively high) levels of co-financing for new interconnectors between EU and EaP countries should 
prove equally successful in principle, although the case of the Romania-Moldova interconnector 
discussed in Section 2.2.2 demonstrates how conflicts of interest arising from Gazprom shareholdings 
can slow down a project even though it is clearly in the national interest. An assumption is made here 
that one should increase the resilience of the transmission systems of the EaP countries against possible 
Russian supply cuts – rather than only increasing the resilience of EU transmission systems. That 
assumption could for instance be justified in terms of foreign policy priorities, e.g. a general willingness 
to support the independence and sovereignty of EaP countries. 
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With that assumption in mind, higher levels of EU co-financing should be made available for such 
projects, but this should be made conditional on the unbundling of gas transmission systems (in 
particular from the supplier, i.e. from Gazprom) and on an implementation of the principle of Third Party 
Access. Those are the crucial elements from the Acquis which should be prioritised, whilst avoiding 
excessively procedural approaches to non-essential elements. After all, one should not expect countries 
that have no clear prospect of EU membership to unilaterally adopt entire packages of legislation that 
were designed for existing Member States who, in the main, face rather different challenges. A more 
realistic course of action is to recognise that EaP countries may need to be able to pursue more 
‘nationalistic’ policies given the on-going threat of encroachment on their sovereignty, and that money 
spent on decreasing the energy vulnerability of those countries represents a wise strategic investment 
for Member States. 
Diversification 
Turning now to the question of strategic diversification, the core issue is that some Member States have 
supported Gazprom’s “transit avoidance” projects (Nord Stream and South Stream). As a result there is a 
direct clash of interests between a number of Member States and some of the EaP countries. This 
problem is further entrenched by the absence of any single actor, political or commercial, who could 
federate the interests at stake. There is currently little scope for the first-best policy option, which would 
be to regulate strategic investments in transit infrastructure at a pan-European level, i.e. EU, EaP, and 
Russia together, according to commonly-agreed criteria of economic efficiency, and with due regard for 
the energy security of all countries. This could be based, e.g., on open competitive tendering for cross-
border pipeline projects, rather than on strategically selective projects that entrench win-lose solutions 
between stronger and weaker states. 
While this type of first-best solution may seem a distant prospect in light of recent experience and 
existing interests, political actors at both the EU and Member State levels should consider it, e.g. as part 
of longer-term strategic energy policy reflections. In many ways this suggested solution is merely an 
extension of existing efforts to reach out to both EaP countries and Russia in the field of energy while 
encouraging a greater recourse to open and competitive markets. 
For the near-term, it is worth noting the structural shift that has gradually unfolded thanks to liquefied 
natural gas. In light of greater interconnection within Central and Eastern Europe and due to more 
favourable relative prices, the business case for new LNG terminals is often favourable. From an energy 
security perspective there is a good case for public co-financing (both EU and national). System 
resilience (in the face of supply cuts) can change radically with the addition of new entry points for 
supplies. Furthermore an LNG terminal is typically a more rapid path towards achieving lower energy 
vulnerability, with the added economic benefit of attaining higher bargaining power with pre-existing 
suppliers. Moldova and Belarus are landlocked so any workable solution would have to include at least 
one foreign partner, Romania and (most likely) Poland, respectively. Ukraine has its own plans for an 
LNG terminal on the Black Sea, with Azerbaijan playing a role as a key supplier, see Section 3.2.2. 
LNG and unbundling: lessons from the Baltic States 
Some similarities exist between the three Baltic States and the three EaP countries of Eastern Europe. 
They are all entirely reliant on Russia for natural gas supplies, typically from separate cross-border 
pipelines, and have little or no interconnection to one another. System resilience is thus relatively low in 
each case, and bargaining power with respect to Gazprom is limited, and is further reduced in most 
cases due to direct ownership stakes of Gazprom in their main gas companies. Also, in spite of common 
challenges and a shared history, both the Baltic States and the three EaP countries do not collaborate 
easily on major energy infrastructure projects. In the case of the Baltic States, an external observer 
would readily support a shared LNG terminal and two interconnectors for the three countries as a 
collaborative and cost-effective way of boosting security of supply. Recent developments suggest that 
Lithuania might choose to go it alone – and thus not be dependent on the timely construction of the 
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necessary interconnectors and on risks of coordination problems and delays connected to a shared LNG 
terminal. It is also to be noted that Lithuania shall proceed with full unbundling (ownership unbundling) 
of its transmission system, in spite of objections from Gazprom and from E.ON which, together, have 
dominant stakes in the gas companies of all three Baltic States. Lithuania’s LNG terminal is planned to 
have enough capacity to replace all of its current imports from Russia. Estonia is now considering a 
similar policy, with essentially the same components, i.e. unbundling and its own LNG terminal. Last but 
not least, secondary trading should develop in the region with Finland. 
The Baltic experience reinforces the conclusion that even bilateral cooperation between good 
neighbours is challenging when it comes to large-scale energy infrastructure projects. More importantly 
it offers a blueprint for a radical shift away from traditional patterns of dependence: ownership 
unbundling and diversification of sources based on LNG. 
3.2.2 Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 
From the EU perspective the South Caucasus is mainly of interest as a corridor linking Azerbaijani 
resources (and perhaps one day Central Asian resources), through Georgia, and onto Turkey and the 
Black Sea. Energy efficiency is also an area of some interest in the region (in this case including 
Armenia), although progress on this issue is far less critical for EU interests than in the case of Ukraine, 
Belarus, or Moldova. As for production, as Georgia can source all of its needs from Azerbaijan and 
Azerbaijan is assumed to be a benign regional energy power, there is less urgency in supporting the 
development of unconventional resources than in Eastern Europe. The analysis in this section therefore 
focuses exclusively on the question of diversification, both from the EU perspective and from the 
perspective of EaP countries. 
Further cooperation between EaP countries in the area of natural gas is emerging as Ukraine is planning 
an LNG terminal on the Black Sea which could source some of its imports from Azerbaijan (shipped from 
Georgian ports). The two countries announced that they would sign an agreement to form a joint 
venture for LNG supplies in January 2012, see NewsAz (2012). This project comes in addition to the 
diversification of export destinations and export routes for Azerbaijan that were highlighted in Section 
1.3.3. LNG or CNG (compressed natural gas) shipments to Romania and/or Bulgaria are also under 
consideration, alongside piped gas exports to Turkey. All of these export options involve Georgia as a 
transit country, relying on Georgian ports in the case of LNG/CNG shipments. There is therefore a strong 
mutual interest all along the supply chain, naturally leading to multilateral cooperation between the 
countries involved. As the Russian Federation shows no sign of wanting to drop the South Stream 
project, the pattern that emerges once again is that countries that wish to diversify away from Russia 
are more likely to do so, and are more likely to be successful in doing so, by opting for sea-bound 
supplies, mainly LNG, but possibly CNG in certain cases. Larger continental European importer states as 
well as Russia, by contrast, mainly stick to the ‘old fashioned’ long-term stability of large cross-border 
pipeline projects.  
Box 2. Shale gas and the environment: battle lines from Dimock to Sofia 
The key questions from the environmental perspective are as follows: does hydraulic fracturing (the 
main technique used to produce shale gas) lead to contamination of drinking water; and what is the 
carbon footprint of shale gas production.  
The first set of questions was the main focus of the 2011 amateur documentary film Gasland which 
rapidly became the central reference point for anti-fracking campaigners. In reality, Gasland revealed 
little that had not already been addressed by state authorities. Much of the US discussion has centered 
on Dimock, a small township in Pennsylvania. Already in November 2009 the state of Pennsylvania had 
found that the Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation had “caused or allowed the unpermitted discharge of 
natural gas” into groundwater, and that this had occurred, not due to hydraulic fracturing (which occurs 
deep in the ground, far below groundwater levels), but due to “insufficient or improperly cemented 
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casing” at several wells. This type of environmental risk is neither new (all oil and gas wells need proper 
casing to prevent oil or gas seeping into the ground) nor at all difficult to overcome. An agreement was 
reached, see Pennsylvania (2009), whereby the company would upgrade the casings of existing wells, 
submit the casing and cementing plans for new wells to the authorities in advance of new drilling 
operations, and organise and finance all necessary replacement solutions for water supply to residents. 
The debate at the scientific level is perhaps best encapsulated in Osborn et al. (2011). Its authors sample 
drinking water from 68 private water wells located close to shale gas production sites. Of those that 
show high levels of methane, all but one are within 1000 meters of the nearest gas well. Crucially, the 
authors find no evidence of contamination from the pollutants that are used for the hydraulic fracturing 
(fracking) process, the central worry portrayed in Gasland. However they do show that the gas detected 
in the water wells originates from the gas extraction process, not from other (e.g. natural) sources. Only 
two explanations are consistent with these observations: faulty casings along gas wells closer to the 
surface, as occurred in Dimock, or some of the gas released deep underground by the fracking process 
has seeped all the way up (hundreds of meters) to groundwater levels. As Osborn et al. (2011) note, 
comprehensive (and compulsory) data collection would be helpful in order to strengthen 
understanding. The second set of environmental questions concerns the carbon footprint of shale gas 
extraction. Howarth et al. (2011) generated much controversy with their early finding that the footprint 
of shale gas is as bad as or worse than that of coal. More recent research by Jiang et al. (2011) leads to 
different results: the footprint of shale gas is found to be only marginally higher than that of 
conventional natural gas, comparable to that of imported LNG, and much lower than that of coal. 
In Europe the political debate on the environmental impacts of shale gas took a predictable turn. Shale 
gas represents a substantial threat to established (“incumbent”) energy interests, and it was to be 
expected that special interests would seek to generate political pressure to protect existing market 
shares. The Bulgarian case is telling. Shale gas exploration was abruptly banned by government 
decision on 18 January 2012, see Reuters (2012). One of Bulgaria’s leading newspapers, Trud, slammed 
the decision on 2 February 2012, attributing resistance to shale gas to the “Russian Residence” (i.e. the 
Russian intelligence service) and likening shale gas protests to “anti-American and anti-imperialist 
activities organized by the Party and Komsomol organizations of students and workers from the Cold 
War”, see Trud (2012). The article goes on to describe how entrenched domestic interests went along 
with this general movement and supported the ban “without arguments”, and “against the national 
interest”. The thesis presented in the Trud article was confirmed, if in more cautious language, by 
Bulgaria’s Energy Minister, Traicho Traikov on 16 February, see Novinite (2012), where he stated: “I shall 
not be pointing a finger at anyone, but let me say who is interested in all of this - it is the defenders of 
the status quo”. He further clarified that shale gas “is a precious resource for achieving Bulgaria's energy 
independence and if we can use it safely, I do not see why not”, and indicated that the debate on shale 
gas will resume.  
 
3.3 Energy vulnerability assessment: crude oil 
In the EaP countries, as in EU Member States and in most other countries in the world, the 
overwhelming share of demand for oil products comes from the transport sector. The transport sector is 
in turn almost exclusively reliant on oil products – hence the notion that oil is the strategic commodity 
par excellence. 
Crude oil is traded on a global market, with strong possibility for arbitrage that imposes strong price 
convergence. As a result, security of oil supply is usually analysed very differently from security of gas 
supply. For countries that have access to the sea, targeted supply cut-offs have very weak effects as 
substitute sources are readily available (though with a premium). Global demand and supply 
developments ultimately drive the price, however, leading to global rather than regional price shocks as 
in 1973, 1979, and 2008. It is also worth mentioning that significant oil price shocks are systematically 
Policy Department DG External Policies 
28 
followed by rather severe recessions, an empirical fact that was confirmed once again in 2009. While the 
2009 crisis has rightly been seen mainly as a financial crisis, an often overlooked fact is that the oil price 
spike of 2008 almost certainly made things much worse. 
Oil security is traditionally attained by ensuring sufficient upstream investment, at home if relevant, and 
abroad, and by making sure that supply routes are many, and are safe. Demand-side developments and 
policies have overwhelmingly focused on increasing efficiency, i.e. higher mileage per litre of fuel, rather 
than on substitution in favour of other fuels. However the nature of the discourse has changed radically 
in the last 2-3 years, primarily as a response to the 2008 oil shock. For the first time there are credible 
prospects for alternative fuels, in particular for battery-electric cars. It seems quite feasible that one 
could phase out conventional cars, at least in urban areas, over the next few decades. Indeed the 
European Commission has expressed exactly this vision in its recent Transport White Paper, see DG 
Move (2011).  
This makes good sense. The general consensus among energy experts is that the world is running out of 
cheap oil. The IEA only manages to project an increased global production of liquid fuels over the next 
couple of decades by including gas-to-liquid technologies, unconventional oil (e.g. tar sands), and 
conventional production from fields that have yet to be discovered, see IEA (2012). Concretely, the 
world will not run out of liquid fuel, but it is running out of cheap conventional oil. Prices will therefore 
remain high on average, and violent price increases of the kind seen in 2007-2008 could happen again. 
The time for preparing a comprehensive shift away from oil has come.  
On the other hand, as this transition may take a couple of decades to be achieved, the regional oil trade 
will continue and will be subject to somewhat similar geopolitical positioning as in the gas trade. Three 
of the six EaP countries are landlocked and most of them depend overwhelmingly on Russian oil, mostly 
delivered by pipeline. This pattern of entrenched, infrastructure-related dependence is similar to that 
found with natural gas. Prices are also not always in line with international prices: country-specific price 
discounts (as compared to the global average price) have been a component of Russia’s external oil 
policy, as in the case of natural gas (as compared, e.g., to the German border price). A further reason to 
be concerned about Russian oil supplies in the region is that numerous supply cut-offs have occurred, 
e.g. to Belarus, but also to Member States (Lithuania, Czech Republic). 
Diversification of oil supply sources 
The EaP countries have shown considerably more interest in dealing with the second problem than 
with the first. Concerning alternative sources and routes for oil, one major development in the region 
was Ukraine’s stop-go attempts to use the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline as a conduit for imports from new 
suppliers into Ukraine and further on to Belarus or Poland. The latter was the rationale for building the 
pipeline in the first place (it was developed by Ukraine and finalised in 2001), with a view to supplying 
Caspian oil to Europe without transiting through Russia. Russian oil companies exerted strong pressure 
to be able to use the pipeline in the other direction – as an additional export route for Russian oil 
delivered into Ukraine which would then be exported by sea from Odessa – and while deliveries of that 
nature were actually made, the pipeline was under-utilised, thus suggesting that the true motive was to 
systematically book capacity on the pipeline to prevent its intended use, i.e. a tactic of denial of access, 
see Socor (2011). The relative strength of the various actors in the region is underscored by the fact that 
the pipeline only recently started to be used in the intended direction – with Azerbaijani oil – after 
Russian oil companies had re-directed their exports to Baltic Sea ports. On the other hand the current 
use of the pipeline is true to the original intention and it does represent successful cooperation 
between EaP countries. Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have held talks about the 
possibility of shipping Azerbaijani oil through this route and onwards to Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic using already existing infrastructure. These developments are very positive both for 
cooperation between EaP countries (not only Ukraine and Azerbaijan, but also Georgia as the first 
transit country, and Belarus as a destination country) and for cooperation between EaP countries and 
EU Member States (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and potentially Hungary, Poland, and perhaps others). 
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As noted in Socor (2011), these developments revive old hopes for an extension pipeline from Brody to 
Gdansk in Poland. Such a link between the Baltic and Black Seas would have a multiplier effect on the 
diversification options of the entire region. 
Reducing dependence: Moving away from oil 
As suggested earlier, moving away from oil is a “big idea” that is laying down roots in Western countries 
far more than in the EaP region. The countries of the region are of course technology followers, not 
technology leaders, and even in Western countries a rapid shift in favour of electric cars would take time 
and require substantial infrastructure adaptation. Charging pods, and possibly battery-swapping 
stations, are only one part of the challenge. Electric grids need to be adapted to handle more demand 
and, more importantly, new demand patterns. A reasonable expectation is therefore that the countries 
of the region would rather take a wait-and-see approach, and adopt new transport and mobility 
technologies and concepts once they have matured further West. That said there is no reason to delay 
common reflections and common work towards transforming the transport system. With the natural 
exception of Azerbaijan, the countries of the region have every reason to be interested notably in 
electric vehicles, at least in the urban context. Similarly to the discussion on energy efficiency and 
renewable, cooperation at the municipal level could be particularly interesting, e.g. involving front-
runner cities such as Copenhagen (which has been cooperating with the company Better Place) or Paris 
(which is currently deploying a municipal car-sharing scheme based on a fleet of electric cars). 
Conversely, the deployment of vehicles running on natural gas – in a sense the response of the oil and 
gas industry to the challenge of electric cars – would obviously be a move in the wrong direction for the 
countries of the region who should mitigate their overall demand for natural gas rather than boost it by 
opening up new market segments. 
3.4 Moving forward 
In spite of the difficulties highlighted in Section 1, several examples of successful commercial and inter-
governmental cooperation can be observed in the EaP region and between the region and EU Member 
States. This is most visible in terms of the actual and potential shipments of both oil and gas from 
Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Ukraine. Ukraine can then serve as a platform for further deliveries to 
Central Europe as well as to Belarus and Moldova.   
What may finally be emerging, if very haltingly, is a loose region straddling Central and Eastern Europe 
and the South Caucasus, including both EU and non-EU countries, which are gradually developing new 
sources and new routes for energy supplies in a manner which does not objectively contradict the 
established bilateral relationships between larger Member States and the Russian Federation. While the 
latter continues to rely on the “Russian model” of long-term bilateral integration based on bespoke 
pipelines and long-term contracts, the former may flourish based on interconnection and sea-based 
transportation of fossil fuels (both LNG and crude oil). These are potentially very positive developments, 
and analyses suggest that, ultimately, the EaP countries have far more to learn and far more to share 
with the New Member States than with countries further West, at least in terms of security of supply. 
At the same time it remains in the common interest of the EU as a whole to foster greater energy 
efficiency, lower import dependence, the adoption of renewable energy, and transport system 
transformation. These are the policy objectives that everyone can in principle agree on, and this report 
has shown that bottom-up approaches notably at the municipal level may be a promising way forward, 
although price reform (e.g. using taxation) remains the most effective path for achieving changes to 
demand patterns. 
The existing policy areas that have been identified for multilateral cooperation with the EaP countries 
are all justified and are all worth pursuing. Two additional areas were underscored in this report: the 
production of unconventional fossil fuels (in particular shale gas), and moves towards lower 
dependence on oil in the transport sector.  
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Also, a clearer recognition should perhaps be reached on the fact that some of the “hard components” 
of security of supply, including domestic production (including shale gas) and the development of new 
infrastructure (interconnectors, LNG terminals, oil pipelines) will mainly involve regional cooperation 
with the New Member States and will not be seen as priorities for other Member States. On the other 
hand, overall arrangements concerning the supply of Russian gas through traditional routes, including 
the need for an effective Early Warning Mechanism, need a pan-European framework that includes both 
Russia and the EaP countries. Some “variable geometry” is therefore necessary and justified. On the 
other hand, the existing instruments and processes in relation to energy security in the East (EaP, BSS, 
ECT, INOGATE, the Baku Initiative/Process) lack coherence in terms of what support they provide. 
Greater alignment and coordination is therefore essential. 
Concerning relations with the Russian Federation, the fact that Russia never ratified the Energy Charter 
Treaty should not be taken as a definitive failure. A legal framework between all relevant parties 
including Russia should remain an important political goal. Such a framework, if adequately designed 
and implemented, could ensure that possible conflicts are dealt with on a legal, rather than on a 
political, basis.  
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ANNEX 1. DEFINITIONS 
Mt   Million ton 
Mcm  Million cubic meter 
Bcm  Billion cubic meter 
TWh  Terawatt hour 
Mtoe  Million ton of oil equivalent 
MW                Megawatt 
It is assumed that: 
1 bcm = 0.9 Mtoe 
1 TWh = 0.08 Mtoe 
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ANNEX 2 - TABLE 1. ENERGY PRODUCTION IN 2009 (IN MTOE) 
 Oil Gas Coal Electricity19 Total 
EU27 99.00 (15%) 154.35 (23%) 157.70 (23%) 261.55 (39%) 672.60 
Armenia 0 0 0 0.50 (100%) 0.50 
Azerbaijan 50.60 (77%) 13.32 (20%) 0 1.89 (3%) 65.81 
Belarus 1.50 (35%) 0.18 (4%) 0 2.58 (61%) 4.26 
Georgia 0 0 7.41 (91%) 0.72 (9%) 8.13 
Moldova 0.01 (3%) 0 0 0.29 (97%) 0.30 
Ukraine 4.20 (6%) 17.37 (23%) 38.40 (51%) 14.86 (20%) 74.83 
                                                               
19  As stated in the first part, electricity encompasses both nuclear energy and renewables. 
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ANNEX 3 -TABLE 2 . ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN 2009 (IN MTOE) 
 Oil Gas Coal Electricity Total 
Popula
tion (in 
million 
people) 
Figure 
per capita 
(Mtoe/ 
inhabitant) 
EU27 670.20 (43%) 412.65 (16%) 259.90 (26%) 233.78 (15%) 1576.48 501 3.15 
Armenia 0 1.49 (78%) 0 0.43 (22%) 1.92 2.96 0.65 
Azerbaijan 3.20 (27%) 7.02 (60%) 0 1.43 (12%) 11.65 9.20 1.27 
Belarus 9.30 (29%) 19.80 (61%) 0.32 (1%) 2.83 (9%) 32.25 9.64 3.35 
Georgia 0.40 (15%) 1.53 (59%) 0.03 (1%) 0.65 (25%) 2.61 4.61 0.57 
Moldova 0.01 (1%) 2.61 (84%) 0.18 (6%) 0.27 (9%) 3.10 3.77 0.82 
Ukraine 14.18 (13%) 48.15 (44%) 35.00 (32%) 13.06 (12%) 110.39 45.70 3.15 
Sources: BP, Business Monitor International, Energy Charter Secretariat, Eurostat, IHS CERA, INOGATE, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, US Census Bureau, US Energy Information Agency. 
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ANNEX 4 – TABLE 3. ENERGY DEMAND IN 2015 (IN MTOE) 
 
Oil Gas Coal Electricity Total 
Popul
ation 
(in 
million 
people) 
Figure per 
capita 
(Mtoe/ 
inhabitant) 
EU27 531.44 (34%) 514.80 (33%) 259.70 (16%) 268.00 (17%) 1573.94 508.23 3.1 
Armenia 0 2.25 (79%) 0 0.60 (21%) 2.85 2.98 0.96 
Azerbaijan 4.85 (28%) 11.16 (64%) 0 1.46 (8%) 17.47 9.78 1.79 
Belarus 7.40 (24%) 20.07 65%) 0.20 (0%) 3.14 (10%) 30.81 9.44 3.26 
Georgia 0.72 (1%) 1.53 (84%) 0.02 (6%) 0.82 (27%) 3.09 4.52 0.68 
Moldova 0.04 (1%) 2.88 (84%) 0.20 (6%) 0.30 (9%) 3.42 3.54 0.97 
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ANNEX 5 – TABLE 4. ENERGY DEMAND IN 2035 (IN MTOE) 
 Oil Gas Coal Electricity Total 
Populat
ion (in 
million 
people) 
Figure per 
capita 
(Mtoe/ 
inhabitant) 
EU27 406.61 (29%) 547.2 (39%) 140 (10%) 303.52 (22%) 1397.33 523.54 2.67 
Armenia 0 3.33 (79%) 0 0.87 (21%) 4.2 3.04 1.38 
Azerbaijan 6.4 (26%) 16.29 67%) 0  1.8 (7%) 24.49 10.97 2.23 
Belarus 9 (28%) 18.81 (60%) 0.1 (0%) 43 (12%) 31.61 8.55 3.7 
Georgia 1.8 (34%) 2.61 49%) 
0.02 (0%)  
0.9 (17%) 
5.33 4.11 1.3  
Moldova 0.04 (2%) 3.51 (83%) 
0.24 (6%) 
0.38 (9%) 
4.23 2.79 1.52  
Ukraine 29.07 (21%) 41.49 (30%) 
52.6 (37%) 
17.37 (12%) 
140.53 37.98 3.7  
Sources: BP, Business Monitor International, Energy Charter Secretariat, Eurostat, IHS CERA, INOGATE, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, US Census Bureau, US Energy Information Agency, own estimates. 
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ANNEX 6 – DIAGRAMS 
Graph 1 Share of Natural Gas in Energy Demand in 2009 
 
 
Graph 2_ Growth of Energy Demand in EU-27 (in Mtoe) 
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Graph 3_ Growth of Energy Demand in the six Eastern Partners (in Mtoe) 
 

